Reemployment and substitution effects from increased activation: Evidence from times of crisis by Martins, Pedro S. & Pessoa e Costa, Sofia
 Reemployment and 
Substitution Effects 
from Increased 
Activation: Evidence 
from Times of Crisis 
Pedro S. Martins 
Sofia Pessoa e Costa 
 
Working Paper 
# 590 
 
 
2014 
Reemployment and substitution effects from increased
activation: Evidence from times of crisis∗
Pedro S. Martins†
Queen Mary University of London
& CEG-IST & IZA
Sofia Pessoa e Costa‡
Universite´ catholique de Louvain
& CGR-QMUL
October 23, 2014
Abstract
Although activation services such as monitoring, training, or job subsidies have been
shown to increase exits from unemployment, there is little comprehensive evidence about
the effects of activation during recessions. Here we evaluate a large activation programme
introduced in Portugal in 2012, a time of very high unemployment. This programme
required specific unemployment benefit recipients to meet jobcentre caseworkers and then
participate in active labour market policies. Our analysis draws on rich longitudinal data,
the programme’s focus on those unemployed for at least six months, and fuzzy regression
discontinuity methods. We find that, despite the weak labour market, the programme
is very successful as it doubles the monthly reemployment probability. The results are
robust to a number of checks, including a falsification exercise based on pre-programme
data and an analysis of non-employment and income effects. Moreover, in a novel IV
approach using information on all unemployed, we find no evidence of substitution effects
such as decreased transitions to employment amongst non-eligible individuals.
Keywords: Public employment services, job search, public policy evaluation.
JEL Codes: J64, J68, J22.
∗We thank comments from Torben Andersen, Erich Battistin, Patricia Borges, Michael Lechner, Domingos
Lopes, Giulia Santangelo, Arne Uhlendorff and seminar participants at Nova School of Business and Economics,
Queen Mary University of London, the European Commission, the Bundesbank, Maynooth University, PEJ
(University of Minho) and St Gallen University. We also thank financial support from the European Union
under the ‘ActiValuate: Counterfactual impact evaluation of a large activation programme’ project (DG Em-
ployment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, European Commission) and research assistance from Mariana Tavares.
Part of this paper was written at Nova SBE, whose hospitality is greatly appreciated. We are also grateful for
data access provided by the Ministry of the Economy and Employment, Portugal. Sole responsibility lies with
the authors and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information
contained herein.
†Email: p.martins@qmul.ac.uk. Address: School of Business and Management, Queen Mary, University
of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, United Kingdom. Phone: +44/0 2078827472. Fax: +44/0
2078823615. Web: http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/pmartins.
‡Email: sofia.pessoaecosta@uclouvain.be. Address: Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Place de
l’Universite´ 1, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
1
1 Introduction
The current high levels of unemployment across many countries, following the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, raise considerable interest on the relative merits and potential of activation pro-
grammes (OECD 2013). These programmes involve a number of measures, typically led by
public employment services, directed towards reducing the length of a joblessness spell, such
as counselling, training, workfare, monitoring or sanctions (OECD 2007). Nevertheless, al-
though several studies have evaluated activation programmes across different countries and
time periods, the literature - which we review in the next section - does not include, to the
best of our knowledge, any analysis of such interventions implemented during periods of high
unemployment.
However, it is particularly important to assess activation programmes during such times
of crisis. Indeed, there is a pressing need, at such times, for policies that may deliver results
relatively quickly in terms of reducing or, at least, containing unemployment. Moreover,
from a theoretical perspective, it is unclear whether activation is more or less effective at
such times. On the one hand, economic downturns may be exactly when the benefits from
activation efforts, namely in terms of enhanced reemployment, are at their weakest. This
follows from the diminished number of vacancies available and the greater competition for
them from the larger pool of job applicants, increasing the scope for displacement effects
(Cre´pon et al. 2013). On the other hand, activation may have a greater reemployment impact
during recessions if the unemployed focus more on formal job search at those times (van den
Berg & van der Klaauw 2006), to the extent that activation tends to be more directed towards
formal than informal job search. Lock-in effects may also be less relevant during recessions,
as employment alternatives to training are scarcer (Lechner & Wunsch 2009).
Findings regarding the effects of activation programmes during periods of downturn are
also relevant from the perspective of the on-going policy debate in the European Union and
elsewhere on the relative merits of structural reforms and aggregate demand expansion. Sim-
ilarly, the major new European Union (2013) initiative establishing a ‘Youth Guarantee’,
whereby all those aged below 25 are to obtain a job, training or education offer over the first
four months of their unemployment spell, can also be informed by such findings.
This paper addresses this major gap in the external validity of the activation literature by
evaluating a large programme implemented in Portugal in early 2012. This is a country and
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time period when unemployment reached unprecedented levels: the unemployment rate was
14.9% in the first quarter of 2012, having increased from 7.6% in the same quarter of 2008.
Moreover, the increase in unemployment was largely driven by low hirings, caused by a ‘perfect
storm’ of austerity measures, economic uncertainty, financial deleveraging, weakened external
demand, high and pervasive minimum wages and downward wage rigidities. Such extreme
economic environment, prompting a substantially weakened labour demand, particularly in
terms of new hires, interacted with relatively generous unemployment benefits (UBs) and
other unfavourable institutional labour-market aspects (described later), made the public
employment service activation efforts studied here particularly challenging.
The programme we evaluate, Convocato´rias, was based on requiring that certain groups
of unemployed individuals participate in meetings in jobcentres. Following the meetings, and
depending on the specific individual assessment conducted by their caseworkers, including fur-
ther monitoring of the job search efforts, the targeted unemployed would be directed towards
active labour market measures, including counselling, traineeships, job subsidies, training, or
workfare. Some unemployed would also be directed towards job interviews, if good matches
with available vacancies were found. The introduction of Convocato´rias also corresponded to
a shift in the activation work of the public employment service, towards greater effort targeted
at those registered with the public employment service for longer periods of time, including
unemployment benefits recipients (UBRs, henceforth).
As indicated above, and crucially for identification purposes, the programme was targeted
at specific groups of unemployed individuals. These groups were the UBRs of a certain
age range (45 or above) or of a certain unemployment benefit (UB) duration range (six
months or more). These criteria establish clear differences in programme eligibility across UB
duration levels, which we explore through a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach (Lee &
Lemieux 2010). In particular, in this paper we focus on those aged 44 or less that are targeted
exclusively by the UB duration criteria. We then study the effects of the programme in terms
of reemployment and other outcome variables on UBRs unemployed for six months or more
in comparison with UBRs employed for less than six months.
The empirical analysis draws on two detailed administrative data sets, each one including
longitudinal individual information on the population of those unemployed over the first twelve
months of the programme. The first data set is drawn from the records of the Portuguese
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public employment service and includes information such as the date of registration in the
jobcentre and the date when the unemployed was subject to the Convocato´rias programme
(if applicable), as well as several background variables. The second data set is based on social
security information and includes records on the employment status, salaries and UBs of each
individual in each month. After merging the two data sets, we follow individuals as they
are unemployed, subject or not to the Convocato´rias intervention, and eventually return to
employment.
Our results indicate that the increased activation efforts delivered by the programme had
large positive effects in terms of reemployment. This is an important result, particularly
given the challenging economic and labour market conditions and the relatively light nature
of the intervention. In fact, the estimates imply a doubling of the probability of next-month
reemployment for those subject to the programme. The effects estimated are typically of at
least 4%, a percentage that exceeds the average monthly reemployment probability over the
relevant unemployment duration range. These findings are also found to be robust to a large
number of checks, including the analysis of different subsamples of unemployed individuals
and a falsification exercise based on pre-programme social security data.
Moreover, we draw on our coverage of all the unemployed registered in jobcentres, including
those not entitled to UBs, to assess the magnitude of any substitution or displacement effects.
In this case, some or all of the reemployment effects would come at the cost of fewer transitions
amongst non-eligible unemployed. However, we find no evidence of decreased transitions to
employment amongst non-eligible unemployed, even when instrumenting the outflows of the
target unemployed groups using information on the number of Convocato´rias interventions
across jobcentres over time.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section provides a review of activation
practices and of the literature on the impact of activation programmes. Section 3 describes
the activation programme and its context, namely in terms of labour market institutions.
Section 4 presents the data sets and their descriptive statistics while the econometric model is
introduced in Section 5. The reemployment and substitution results are presented in Sections
6 and 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
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2 Activation practices and programmes
Many countries have implemented activation strategies aimed at increasing work incentives
and opportunities for UBRs and other unemployed individuals. These can be particularly
important not only in terms of addressing moral hazard issues but also to foster effective
lifelong learning perspectives. These activation strategies are generally two-fold, including
monitoring and sanction procedures, as well as ALMPs, counselling and job search assistance.
Moreover, their implementation procedures tend to exhibit a considerable deal of diversity
across countries, including in terms of an ‘extensive margin’ regarding the number or percent-
age of unemployed that are interviewed in jobcentres and an ‘intensive margin’ concerning
the extent to which such initial interviews, which typically involve lighter interventions, then
lead to further involvement in ALMPs, such as training or workfare.
To shed light on these aspects, we present a summary of their characteristics across eight
countries, based on OECD (2007), in Tables A.2 and A.3. We consider several dimensions of
such procedures, including placement efforts at initial registration, frequency of reporting, use
of direct referrals, collective information sessions and job search verification during participa-
tion. Across the eight countries considered, the differences in activation practices appear to
be particularly important in terms of ‘Services provided by the Public Employment Service’
and ‘Participation in ALMPs’. These differences raise external validity questions regarding
the extent to which the results from activation studies can be expected to hold in different
countries. Indeed, such and other institutional aspects, including the generosity of the UBs,
can interact powerfully with activation efforts.
In most countries considered, the public employment service (PES, henceforth) uses direct
referrals to help the unemployed re-enter the labour market, although there is variation on the
average number of direct referrals, as well as on who reports on application outcomes. There
are also important differences on how the PES engages with the unemployed, namely in terms
of the frequency of interviews (some countries do not have a specific timing defined, others
meet with the unemployed fortnightly), in terms of collective information sessions and in terms
of individual action plans (in some countries the action plan is written up after one week to
one month of unemployment while in other countries only after nine months). Participation
in ALMPs tends to be compulsory in most countries although job search requirements may
not be imposed during such periods.
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From a theoretical perspective on activation, in particular in the context of job search
models, activation programmes may increase the cost of being unemployed, leading the un-
employed to increase their job search and or decrease their reservation wages, leading to an
increase in transitions out of unemployment.1 This is indeed the result most commonly found
in the literature that conducts evaluations of specific activation programmes, as we explain
below and summarise in Table A.1.
Despite the general finding of an increase in transitions out of unemployment from acti-
vation programmes, there is not a consensus on the typical destination state. One strand of
the literature finds that the increase in transitions out of unemployment is accompanied by
an increase in transitions to employment. For instance, Graversen & van Ours (2008) study
a mandatory experimental activation programme in Denmark. They find that unemployment
duration decreases by 2.5 weeks (compared to a median of 11.5 weeks) and transitions to
employment increase by 30%. Graversen & van Ours (2008) justify these large effects with
programme duration and intensity, which involves several steps: first, a notification letter;
second, participation in a job search programme; and third, participation in an ALMP. In-
deed, during the job search stage, the unemployed attend weekly or fortnightly meetings with
caseworkers where they receive counselling, are referred to job offers and have their job search
efforts monitored.
Klepinger et al. (2002) study the impact of tighter search requirements (a doubling of the
standard number of employer contacts per month), monitoring (verification of work-search
contacts) and counselling (participation in a job search workshop) on total UB paid and UB
duration based on a 1994 experiment in Maryland. They find that both more demanding
search requirements and monitoring lead to a decrease of around 6% in UB payments and
a decrease of between 6 and 7% in the number of weeks on UB. Counselling also reduces
UB payments and unemployment duration. Klepinger et al. (2002) also study the impact on
employment and earnings and find little impact on both. Similar results were found for other
countries, namely the UK (Dolton & O’Neill 2002) and Australia (Borland & Tseng 2007).
In another interesting study, McVicar (2008) evaluates the impact of a complete interrup-
tion in monitoring, when activation was suspended for exogenous reasons in different parts
of Northern Ireland and for different periods between 1999 and 2005. The results indicate
1See Cockx et al. (2014) for a theoretical analysis of the welfare effects of job search requirements, in
particular of the extent to which procrastination may make such requirements Pareto improving.
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that a total lack of monitoring leads to an important decrease in transitions out of unemploy-
ment, mainly explained by a decrease of transitions to employment. Several other studies also
find positive effects of activation programmes on transitions to employment (van den Berg
et al. 2004, Geerdsen 2006, Boone et al. 2009, Cockx & Dejemeppe 2012), including van den
Berg et al. (2012) who find further positive effects of jobcentre meetings with caseworkers in
Denmark.
Another strand of the literature finds that the increase in transitions out of unemployment
leads to an increase in transitions to other benefits or non-subsidised unemployment, but
not employment. It is the case of Manning (2009), which evaluates the effect of the job
seekers allowance (JSA) in 1996, using a differences-in-differences approach. He finds that
the tightening of job search requirements, as imposed at that time, can prompt some of
the unemployed to lower their search intensity and move out of subsidised unemployment
altogether, particularly if their previous search intensity was already low (and when UBs
are relatively low). Manning (2009) finds that the JSA reform led to a decrease of around
8% in the number of subsidised unemployed, almost completely explained by the increase
in transitions to non-subsidised unemployment. When considering the impact of the JSA
introduction not only on transitions out of unemployment but also future earnings and weeks
worked, Petrongolo (2009) finds an increase in the former and a decrease in the latter two
variables. These results can be explained by a decrease in reservation wages in the context of
a job search model, leading the unemployed to accept lower-quality jobs.
Other studies, as well as some of those mentioned above, find evidence of ‘threat’ effects:
future participation in a programme increases the perceived cost of being unemployed, leading
to an increase in transitions out of unemployment even before participation takes place (Black
et al. 2003, Geerdsen 2006, Boone et al. 2009, Hagglund 2011, Cockx & Dejemeppe 2012).
For example, Cockx & Dejemeppe (2012) evaluate the impact of a notification letter sent to
the unemployed in Belgium to inform them of the implementation of a new monitoring policy.
They find that transitions to employment increase by nine percentage points, even without
further contacts between the unemployed and the public employment services.
One additional important aspect is that all articles above study the impact of activation
programmes in countries and time periods when the business cycle is at a relatively normal
level. However, the economic climate can interact powerfully with the outcome of a pro-
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gramme. For instance, van den Berg & van der Klaauw (2006) present a job search model
with both formal and informal search and show that the impact of activation strategies,
namely monitoring, on transitions to employment should be larger the worse the (individual
or aggregate) labour market prospects: in the case of a declining labour market, the unem-
ployed will tend to rely extensively on formal search, which is more sensitive to monitoring
than informal search. Using a 1998 natural experiment in the Netherlands, van den Berg &
van der Klaauw (2006) find that both the older and the longer-term unemployed benefit more
from counselling and monitoring. These results are consistent with the perspective that the
effects of activation are stronger the worse the labour market prospects of the unemployed.
Another paper that relates programme participation with the economic climate is Lechner &
Wunsch (2009), which studies the impact of training in times of relatively high unemploy-
ment. They find larger positive long-term effects when unemployment is high. They offer
two explanations for this result. One is that the positive effects of increased human capital
from participation dominate the negative ‘lock-in’ effects in downturns. The other is that pro-
gramme participation during periods of high unemployment avoids unfavorable job matches
that can have negative impacts in future labour outcomes.
The results presented previously generally do not take into account the possible presence
of substitution (or displacement) effects, which occur when positive outcomes for programme
participants are obtained at the expense of negative outcomes for non-participants. In other
words, displacement effects may occur if participants take jobs that non-participants would
otherwise get, with little or no aggregate effect. One of the very few studies that examines such
effects is Blundell et al. (2004), who evaluate the impact of the UK New Deal for Young People
(NDYP) in terms of transitions to employment. The NDYP was first implemented in pilot
areas and afterwards rolled out across the UK. The treatment group considered in Blundell
et al. (2004) are the unemployed aged 19-24 in pilot areas and the control group are the
unemployed of the same age but based in non-pilot areas. After finding positive effects of the
programme of around 20%, Blundell et al. (2004) check for displacement effects by comparing
transitions to employment between the treatment group and a group of non-eligible older (25-
30 years old) unemployed individuals but otherwise very similar, and also based in pilot areas.
The case for displacement effects is not supported given that the treatment effect obtained
under this second analysis is not larger than the effect obtained in the main analysis.
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The only other article that we know of that considers displacements effects is Cre´pon et al.
(2013) who find positive effects for an assistance programme for college-educated unemployed
youth in France. However, these positive results are non-lasting and obtained partly at the
expense of non-treated workers, especially in the case of weak regional labour markets, where
there are many unemployed competing for a relatively small number of job vacancies.
Overall, the literature that evaluates activation programmes tends to find that these have
significant effects in terms of unemployment exits and sometimes also in terms of reemploy-
ment. These effects can be driven by a threat element, which tends to be associated with
informal jobs, especially when UBs are relatively generous. As indicated above, all findings
so far refer to economic environments characterised by relatively low unemployment rates, an
important gap in terms of the external validity of the literature that our paper addresses.
3 The Convocato´rias programme and its context
3.1 The Portuguese labour market
As indicated above, the Convocato´rias programme was implemented in Portugal in 2012, a
year when the country was immersed in an economic and financial crisis, with heavy conse-
quences in terms of unemployment growth and lack of job creation. In fact, the unemployment
rate in Portugal increased steadily since the first quarter of 2008 until the first quarter of 2013,
from 7.6% to 17.4%, having since then decreased to 14.4% (second quarter of 2014). During
the time frame of our study, from February 2012 to February 2013, the quarterly unemploy-
ment rate rose from 14.7% to 17.4%. These rates are at least twice as large as the average
of the rates prevailing at the times of the other programmes we survey in Table A.1 and at
least four percentage points larger than the highest rate over those fourteen studies (8.6% in
Australia in 1997-98).
Another important aspect concerns the proportion of long-term unemployed (those un-
employed for 12 months or more), which was relatively stable at around 50% during 2011
and the first quarter of 2012, but then increased to close to 60% in the first quarter of 2013.
Moreover, the overall number of UBRs (including also means-tested unemployment assistance,
which amounts to about 20% of the total) peaked at 421,000 in April 2013, from a lowest level
over the cycle of 243,000 in July 2008, reaching 361,000 in March 2012, when Convocato´rias
was launched. A related indicator of the severity of the crisis is the number of job vacancies
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available in the PES. Although these are only a subset of approximately 10% of actual vacan-
cies, PES vacancies dropped significantly too, by 30% or more from 2011 to 2012, when they
reached a figure of approximately 5,000 per month.
In terms of the institutional framework surrounding the labour market, UBs can be char-
acterized as relatively generous in their replacement rates and maximum durations but re-
strictive in terms of their coverage of the unemployed. First, the general replacement ratio is
65% in gross terms and 75% in net terms, although the latter figure increases to about 100%
for low-wage workers. Second, benefit entitlement periods range between 9 and 38 months,
depending on age and prior labour market attachment, excluding the means-tested unemploy-
ment assistance provisions, which are available for between half and the same period as UB.
Third, coverage is restricted to those that worked at least 15 months over the previous 24
months and that lose their jobs involuntarily (or whose fixed term contracts expire).
One should note that in March 2012, shortly after the Convocato´rias programme was
introduced, some changes were made to UBs. However, these changes are applicable only to
individuals that become unemployed once the new law came into force, in April 1st. These
changes consisted in wider access (from a minimum of 15 to 12 months of work over the
previous 24 months), shortened maximum durations (but only for those who had not worked
at least 15 months by March 2012), and a 10% cut in the UB amount after six months.
Concerning activation requirements and practices, all UBRs are required to register in
their local jobcentre. Registration establishes a number of duties that the UBR must carry
out, including availability for any ALMPs indicated by the jobcentre and a given minimum
number of job applications every month. UBRs also have to accept to interview for vacan-
cies that the jobcentre deems appropriate (and which pay a salary similar or higher to the
one the UBR earned before becoming unemployed). Moreover, UBRs are required to present
themselves every fortnight at their local council (or jobcentre) to confirm their status as un-
employed. Should the jobcentre consider that the UBR is not complying with its obligations,
the jobcentre may deregister the UBR, implying that the UB will be cut entirely. In practice,
the extreme severity of the penalty implies that it is rarely applied (OECD 2012). Moreover,
the fortnightly attendance check, typically at a local council, also adds little value in terms of
activation as it typically does not involve job search monitoring or other activation services.
See also Tables A.3 and A.3 for a comparison of job search requirements in terms of the fre-
10
quency of reporting, which is typically more intensive in the other countries considered than
in Portugal.
As to other relevant labour market institutions, employment protection legislation is also
regarded as strict, despite recent reforms in the context of the 2011-2014 economic and finan-
cial adjustment programme.2 Moreover, the minimum wage covers a relatively large share
of workers, over 10% in 2012, and amounts to approximately 60% of the median wage. Fur-
thermore, the Portuguese labour law also establishes that base wages cannot be adjusted
downward, even in low inflation environments, except in very specific circumstances. On top
of that, the extension of virtually all collective bargaining agreements to non-affiliated firms
and workers up to mid-2011 created a large number of binding minimum wages for most
occupations and job levels across all sectors Martins (2014a).
Overall, from an institutional perspective, the employment and social security laws and
practices create strict constraints that tend to result in lower hirings and higher levels of
long-term unemployment. Moreover, the activation practices conducted by the PES up to
the introduction of the Convocato´rias programme were also relatively superficial, especially
as far as the UBRs were concerned, and particularly given the relative generosity of UB.
This context creates considerable scope for the observed typical long spells of unemployment
(Portugal & Addison 2008, Addison & Portugal 2008) and their well-known negative impact
upon human capital and future employability.
3.2 The Convocato´rias programme
In March 2012, the Portuguese government launched an action plan aimed at the moderniza-
tion of the PES.3 This action plan included a number of measures, most of which directed
towards a greater activation of the unemployed.
The programme studied in this paper, Convocato´rias, is one of such measures. The pro-
gramme is based on the requirement that the Portuguese PES (IEFP, Instituto do Emprego
e Formac¸a˜o Profissional) calls up all UBRs of specific profiles for meetings with caseworkers
in jobcentres. Moreover, the programme allows jobcentres to establish the content of the
2See OECD (2012) for international comparisons in several indicators and Martins (2014b) for more infor-
mation on this and other labour market reforms introduced between 2011 and 2013 in Portugal. Fixed-term
contracts, unlike their permanent counterparts, are not regarded as restrictive and are also the most common
form of outflow from unemployment.
3This initiative, the ‘Public Employment Service Relaunch Programme’, was estab-
lished by the Council of Ministers Resolution 20/2012, of March 9th, available at
http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2012/03/05000/0105901061.pdf (in Portuguese).
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meeting and their follow-up, subject to the broad guidelines that the PES should take actions
that can activate UBRs and increase their rates of transition to employment. In terms of the
terminology we introduced in Section 2, Convocato´rias strengthened both the extensive and
intensive margins of activation, by widening the range of UBRs subject to jobcentre meetings
and by increasing their involvement in ALMPs, respectively.
In practical terms, the content of the initial meetings and their follow-up actions were var-
ied, depending on the specific profile of each unemployed individual. In general, the jobcentres
monitored the jobsearch effort exerted by the UBR and updated their records regarding the
profile of the UBR with a view to facilitating matches with available vacancies. In several
occasions, the UBR’s personal employment plan, which sets requirements such as a minimum
number of monthly job applications to be sent by each person, were also updated. Moreover,
depending on the specific profile of each individual, the jobcentre would conduct a num-
ber of additional actions. These included jobsearch counselling, job interviews participation
requirements, training, self-employment support, and workfare or traineeship placements.
An additional important aspect concerns the UBR profiles targeted by the programme.
Two specific groups were considered, namely UBRs aged 45 or older, and UBRs unemployed
for at least six months. These two groups were seen to be of greater interest in terms of a more
intense activation work to be delivered by the PES. Moreover, from an operational perspec-
tive, the Convocato´rias programme was implemented gradually, given capacity restrictions
across jobcentres, in some cases also involving a greater priority to meetings with UBRs of
lower schooling levels. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the second group (subsidised
unemployment spells of six or more months), in particular UBRs with unemployment spells of
between 1 and 12 months and not older than 44. The latter restriction ensures that we focus
exclusively on the UBRs only subject to the six-month stream of Convocato´rias. The group
of unemployed aged 45 or older is more challenging to examine, at least based on a regression
discontinuity approach as the one used here, given that the unemployed that register when
they are 45 or older are typically entitled to longer unemployment benefit provision.
Another relevant aspect is the introduction of a wage subsidy, also in the context of the
PES action plan mentioned above. This wage subsidy, Est´ımulo 2012, was targeted exclusively
at those unemployed for at least six months, although including both those entitled or not
to UB.4 In any case, this measure reinforced the range of active labour market policies that
4This measure was established by the Executive Order 45/2012, of February 13th, available at
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could be used under Convocato´rias and therefore increased the scope for additional activation
further to the jobcentre meetings.
Overall, the Convocato´rias programme introduced an important strengthening of the ac-
tivation efforts delivered by the Portuguese PES towards the UBRs and the long-term un-
employed, involving over 240,000 individuals over its first year of operation. Moreover, the
concurrent introduction of Convocato´rias and Est´ımulo 2012 represented a potentially sig-
nificant complementary step in terms of the activation efforts of the Portuguese PES. These
efforts could be particularly important given the time of great turmoil in the labour market.
4 Data
This study draws on two administrative data sets, each one including rich, longitudinal
monthly individual information on the population of individuals unemployed at least once
over the first twelve months of the programme. The first data set was drawn from the records
of the PES (IEFP) and, in its original version, includes the stock of all individuals registered
as unemployed in February 2012 plus the flows of all newly registered unemployed from March
2012 up to March 2013. Most activities that were conducted by jobcentres over that period
are also recorded, such as interviews, job placements, training placements, or deregistrations,
including the specific Convocato´rias intervention studied in this paper. The data also includes
additional information such as the full dates of registration in the jobcentre and when the
unemployed was subject to each intervention, as well as several background variables at the
individual level, including gender, age, schooling and marital status.
The second data set was drawn from the records of the social security data agency (II,
Instituto de Informa´tica da Seguranc¸a Social). These data include information on the em-
ployment status of each individual in each month over the period under analysis, as well as
all earnings, social security contributions and UBs registered. The two data sets were then
merged, creating a new data set that follows individuals as they are unemployed and eventu-
ally return to the labour market (as several of those that are unemployed in February 2012) or
are employed, become unemployed and eventually return to employment (as those individuals
http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2012/02/03100/0073000732.pdf (in Portuguese). Before 2012, the range of
related job subsidies included only an exemption of social security contributions (of 23,75%) for a period of up
to three years when employers hired under permanent contracts individuals that were unemployed for more
than twelve months or individuals that were looking for their first job. This new ALMP offered more generous
support, of up to 60% of the monthly salary for up to six months, and covered fixed-term contracts, a by far
more prevalent contract type in outflows from unemployment.
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that are first unemployed in some point from March 2012).
The merged data set contains one observation for each individual in each month from
February to December 2012. From this data set, we eliminate some individuals or observa-
tions to obtain the final sample which we use to estimate our results. First, given that the
Convocato´rias programme was targeted at subsidised unemployed, we only keep in the sample
individuals that have been enrolled in the PES and have received regular UB at least once
during the reference period. We also exclude individuals whose potential maximum UB dura-
tion is shorter than twelve months, because, as UB potential duration influences transitions
to employment, they may not be comparable to those with longer potential UB duration.
As mentioned previously, Convocato´rias has two eligibility criteria: UBRs who are 45
years old or older and UBRs unemployed for at least six months. Because we want to focus
exclusively on those eligible through UB duration, we exclude from our sample all UBRs that
are at least 45 years old (these UBRs would be automatically eligible as soon as the programme
is introduced, implying the need for a different identification strategy). Moreover, we wish
to focus on UBRs whose maximum UB duration is not smaller neither much larger than
the threshold level of six months, given our regression discontinuity approach. We therefore
exclude all observations whose UB duration is greater than twelve months. Finally, given
our focus on transitions out of unemployment, namely of those subject to the programme,
we consider in our final sample only the observations in which the individual is unemployed,
keeping a record of the timing of a possible transition to employment.
As we can see in Table 1, which describes the participants in the programme by month
of their intervention, Convocato´rias started in March 2012, with around 7,500 unemployed
having participated in that month. Participation increased to around 16,000 in April and
May and then started decreasing, given the decrease in new eligibles to the programme.
Of the approximately 80,000 unemployed that participate in Convocato´rias, around 30,000
participate in ALMPs or in collective sessions on job search techniques.
The table also indicates the average characteristics of participants by month of participa-
tion. It can be seen that age and marital status are relatively constant, while the percentage
of women varies across the period but is always between 40 and 50%. Average schooling years
are relatively lower for those that participate in the first two months, while they remain fairly
stable in the last months of the period, which is driven by some priority attributed to the
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low-skilled unemployed that are eligible. We also find that the distribution of participants by
region is very unequal, given the different sizes of each region: 22,317 in the North, 10,814 in
the Centre, 42,693 in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley, and 1,802 and 3,214 in the Alentejo and
the Algarve, respectively.
In the end, our sample contains 105,595 different individuals and 611,061 (individual-
month) observations. 25,241 individuals (24%) are subject to the programme. The difference
between this figure and the 80,000 reported above is driven by our focus on the stream of
the programme targeted at the unemployed on UB for at least six months (and aged 44 or
less) and the related elimination of those with an UB duration of more than 12 months.
As this programme was targeted initially at the stock of unemployed, many of which have
UB durations of twelve months or more, this naturally leads to a smaller treatment group
under analysis. Other individuals are dropped because of data issues, including those that hold
different types of UBs (income support related) or exhibit several changes between employment
and unemployment over the period considered.
As to the variables used, our main outcome considered is the transition from (subsidised)
unemployment to employment, a dummy equal to one if an UBR becomes employed in the
following month. We also consider other related outcome variables, such as transitions out of
subsidised unemployment and transitions to non-subsidised unemployment. As in the main
case, we assess the transition from the perspective of the month when the individual is still
in a subsidised unemployment situation and conduct the analysis regarding possible changes
in that situation over a one-month time window. A fourth dependent variable concerns the
income of the individual over the following month. This variable can increase, for instance
when an UBR takes a job that pays a salary higher than the UB, or fall, for instance when
an UBR moves to non-subsidised unemployment.
The treatment variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual was treated, that is,
was required to attend a meeting at a jobcentre under the context of Convocato´rias, in that
month. We also draw on an eligibility variable, which is a dummy indicating whether the
unemployed’s UB duration is six months or more. This variable will be used as an instrument
for the treatment, in the context of our fuzzy RD approach (see below).
We use several explanatory variables: age; gender (a female dummy variable); marital
status (married or cohabitant); nationality (foreigner); and schooling years. Other variables
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used are the potential UB duration and the daily UB amount. These indicate, respectively,
the number of days of UB and the amount in euros the unemployed is entitled to at the
moment they become unemployed.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on all the variables mentioned above on all the
observations of the sample used for estimations. We find that the probability of reemployment
in the following month is only 4.4%, while the probability of a transition out of unemployment
is 6.2% (and the probability of a transition to non-subsidised unemployment is 1.7%. Average
monthly income increases is of 1%.
5 The econometric model
Our analysis of the effects of the Convocato´rias programme is based on a regression discon-
tinuity (RD) analysis. Identification draws on the treatment discontinuity that occurs at the
UB duration of six months given that the unemployed are only eligible when their UB spell
hits that threshold. However, not all eligible are treated at that point.
The forcing (or running) variable, Zit, is the UB duration of individual i at month t.
To facilitate the interpretation of results, we center the forcing variable using instead Z˜it =
Zit − Z0, where Z0 is the discontinuity point (Z0 = 6, in our case). The treatment status
variable is Dit, a dummy variable equal to one if individual i is called to a Convocato´rias
jobcentre meeting. Moreover, the outcome variable is Yit, a dummy variable equal to one
when the unemployed individual become employed in month t+ 1. Finally, Xit is a vector of
covariates (gender, age, etc), while S(Zit) is a polynomial function of the (centered) forcing
variable.
As Convocato´rias was implemented gradually, not every UBR participated in the pro-
gramme as soon as they became eligible. Hence, the probability of treatment does not jump
from zero to one at the specific UB duration threshold, Eit = 1[Z˜it ≥ 0], as in a ‘sharp’
RD. Instead, the probability increases from zero to a significant positive value at the eligibil-
ity threshold - the case of a ‘fuzzy’ RD design. This jump is illustrated in Figure 1, which
presents the percentage of the unemployed at each UB duration level that are subject to the
programme (dots). The figure indicates that the probability of being treated is zero up to the
threshold and then jumps to about 0.1 at that level.
The main assumption of the RD approach is that the forcing variable is continuous around
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the threshold. This assumption is not directly testable but a graphical analysis is a useful
check. Figure 1 also indicates the number of observations for each value of the forcing variable
(solid line): unlike in the case of treatment, we find evidence in favour of the continuity of
the forcing variable around the threshold.
It is important to note that the profiles of the unemployed present will typically be dif-
ferent in each level of unemployment duration, in terms of both observable and unobservable
characteristics. This will drive the duration dependence commonly observed in outflows, from
some combination of direct effects from unemployment duration (in terms of reduced human
capital, for instance) and composition effects (greater prevalence of individuals that are less
likely to find jobs at all levels of unemployment). However, to the extent that the six-month
threshold considered here is not associated with other systematic differences across the un-
employed in terms of their likelihood of finding employment other than the effects of the
programme, our results can be interpreted as the causal impact of Convocato´rias.
More specifically, in our case, the fuzzy design is implemented econometrically in terms of
two-stage least squares (2SLS), by estimating the following equation:
Yit = α+ βDit + S(Z˜it) + δXit + it, (1)
in which Eit is used as an instrument for Dit.
Since, in the fuzzy design, the probability of being treated is no longer a deterministic
function of the forcing variable, the discontinuity in the outcome variable at the threshold
cannot be interpreted as an average treatment effect. Nevertheless, Hahn et al. (2001) show
that it is possible to recover the treatment effect by dividing the jump in the outcome variable
at the threshold by the jump in the probability of treatment, also at the threshold. The latter
increase in the probability of treatment is driven by the fraction of individuals induced to
be treated (‘compliers’), who would not be treated in a setting without treatment. This
treatment effect is a weighted local average treatment effect (weighted LATE), where the
weights are the ex-ante likelihood that the individual’s Zit is near the threshold.
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6 Reemployment effects
Given the important visual component of a regression discontinuity analysis, we start this
section by presenting graphical evidence of the effects of the Convocato´rias programme on a
number of variables regarding the programme’s target group. Specifically, Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5
describe, respectively, transitions to employment, transitions out of unemployment, transitions
to non-subsidised unemployment, and income levels percentage changes, the first three in
proportions of the unemployed at different UB duration levels, pooled across different months
over the period covered. All figures also include solid lines on either side of the threshold
obtained from linear splines estimated, respectively, over the (centered) UB duration intervals
[-4;0[ and [0;5].
Figure 2 presents a downward trend in reemployment probabilities (average transitions to
employment) as UB duration increases, consistent with findings of negative duration depen-
dence observed in studies of unemployment duration. However, at the threshold UB duration,
we find graphical evidence of a (discontinuous) increase in the reemployment probability, after
which it resumes its downward trend, although at a flatter rate. Moreover, the gap between
the predicted reemployment probability and the actual value at the threshold unemployment
duration is sizable, of about 1 p.p. In the context of our regression discontinuity approach,
we can interpret this discontinuous increase in the reemployment probability as a treatment
effect, especially after adjusting for the fact that many eligible were not treated. We also
find a very similar pattern in Figure 3, on transitions out of unemployment. The average
values are higher across the range of unemployment durations given the wider coverage of
outcomes (transitions to both employment and non-employment), ranging from 5% and 8%,
while before this range was 3% to 7%, but again there is a pronounced discontinuity at the
threshold duration.
On the other hand, Figure 4 shows that transitions to non-subsidised unemployment in-
crease steadily with UB duration, although at a lower probability than transitions to employ-
ment. More important, we find virtually no discontinuity at the six-month threshold, nor
any sizeable change in the slopes of the best-fit lines. Finally, Figure 5 similarly exhibits no
evidence of a discontinuous change in income levels at the threshold UB duration.
We now test the robustness of the graphical evidence above estimating the model described
in Section 5. In particular, we estimate 2SLS models with a linear spline, S(Z˜it) = pi0Z˜it +
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pi1Z˜itDit, using the eligibility variable Eit as an instrument for the treatment variable Dit
resulting in the following second stage equation:
Yit = α+ βDˆit + ϕ0Z˜it + ϕ1Z˜itDˆit + δXit + it (2)
The key dependent variables considered, Yit, are, in turn, the transitions to employment
(reemployment probability), out of unemployment, to non-subsidised unemployment, and the
income variation in the following period. The remaining terms of the equation are the same
as explained above. The coefficients on the treatment effects are the β’s for each equation,
according to the outcome variable.
Our results following the estimation of the model above are presented in Table 3. We
also present there the results from different spline specifications (across rows). The first-stage
estimates are presented in the last column and are the same for all outcome variables. Each
coefficient and standard error pair across the first four columns corresponds to a separate
estimation of a different model in terms of the outcome variable and the polynomial function.
Turning to the analysis of the estimates, considering the first column, which focuses on
our key dependent variable (transitions to employment), the results across polynomials con-
firm the graphical evidence in Figure 2 and supporting its general robustness. We find in all
models significantly positive effects of participation in the Convocato´rias programme in terms
of reemployment probabilities. The magnitude of the coefficients varies from 2% (linear poly-
nomial) to 9% (quadratic spline). These coefficients represent an increase in reemployment
probabilities from 50% to 225%, taking into account the outcome mean of 4.4% (see the one
but last row in the table).
In terms of the remaining dependent variables, we find that the results on the transitions
out of unemployment are very similar to those on the equivalent specification for transitions
to employment, as predicted from the graphical evidence. In the case of transitions out of
unemployment, the coefficients also range between 2% and 9%. Consistently, the transitions to
non-subsidised unemployment are found not to be affected by the programme, with virtually
all results insignificant. Similarly, no effects are found in terms of income variation, defined
as the percentage change in the sum of all UB and employment earnings.
It is also important to note that the first stage coefficients on eligibility (the instrument)
are always significantly positive, at around 12%, with little variability across polynomial
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functions. This latter results confirms the relevance of the eligibility status as established in
the programme in terms of actual participation in Convocato´rias, namely through a request
that the UBR attends a jobcentre meeting.
Overall, our findings on reemployment effects can be regarded as larger than those com-
monly found in the literature. Out of the 15 studies in Table A.1 only Geerdsen (2006) has
a similar magnitude although that programme was implemented when the unemployment
rate was only 6.1%. One explanation may be related to the relatively light activation efforts
that had been conducted, in general, by the Portuguese PES up until the introduction of
Convocato´rias, especially following the large increase in the number of the unemployed and
fall in vacancies over the previous years. This situation may give rise to higher than average
marginal reemployment benefits even if from relatively moderate levels of activation, such as
the involvement in interviews for available vacancies or one-day jobsearch training sessions,
despite the poor labour market conditions.
Another related explanation concerns the ‘threat’ effect (Black et al. 2003). As the Con-
vocato´rias programme consists of a meeting with a caseworker, generally followed by referrals
to ALMPs, some UBR may perceive participation as an increased cost of being unemployed.
Those UBR may therefore increase job search and or decrease their reservation wage even
before participation or soon after it begins, leading to the documented increase in transitions
out of unemployment. Moreover, the programme may have prompted some targeted UBRs
that were employed informally to stop collecting UB and to register their jobs with social se-
curity given the impending likelihood that they would be required to participate in training or
workfare, for instance. On the other hand, it is important to underline that, unlike Manning
(2009) and Petrongolo (2009), we find that our results on transitions out of unemployment
are exclusively driven by an increase in reemployment probabilities and not by an increase in
transitions to non-subsidised unemployment.
A final explanation for our large positive effects is based on the theoretical discussion in
van den Berg & van der Klaauw (2006). In times of macroeconomic downturns, the effects of
activation programmes on transitions to employment can be larger than in times of positive
and stable macroeconomic environments, under the assumption that the unemployed rely
heavily on formal job search. In this case, activation programmes lead to an increase in
formal search (irrespective of what happens to informal search) and, as such, can have a
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larger impact at those times, as we find in our analysis.
6.1 Robustness checks
Following on the main results documented above, now we present our robustness checks. We
consider our benchmark linear spline specification and focus on the key outcome variable,
the reemployment probability. First, we examine whether our results are affected by the
exclusion of all explanatory variables, except the polynomial function on the forcing variable.
This exercise can shed light on the internal validity of the RD approach (Lee & Lemieux
2010), as individuals are assumed to be assigned to treatment and control groups irrespective
of their background characteristics. Hence, if the RD approach is valid, the results should be
approximately the same, whether we control for background variables or not. This is indeed
what we find in our case: the benchmark coefficient is only slightly different when we estimate
Equation 2 without including covariates (see Table 4 - last row). Similar results (available
upon request) are obtained for other specifications.
We also estimate our model for different subpopulations of interest, in terms of a number
of observable variables (gender, age, schooling, UB potential maximum duration and UB daily
amount). The results, presented in Table 4, indicate the same qualitative findings as before:
the coefficients range between 2% and 10%, with above average effects for women and those
with more than the median schooling of nine years. Moreover, we find below average effects
for those entitled to more than the median UB daily amount of e14.33, with a coefficient of
3.3%. This result is consistent with the theoretical effects of activation on job search: the
greater the generosity of the UB, the less likely that activation will prompt a transition to
employment.
Furthermore, we estimate the same linear spline model for those jobcentres that are more
constrained in terms of their workloads. Specifically, we define a constrained jobcentre as
one where the flow of newly-registered unemployed from March 2012 up to March 2013 at
the jobcentre represents over 70% of the stock of unemployed registered in February 2012 at
the same jobcentre (the median value across all jobcentres). We find below average effects in
constrained jobcentres, which can be explained both by the greater workload of case workers
and the more challenging local labour markets. In any case, it is important to note that, even
in this subgroup, we find significant effects of 2%.
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When analysing graphically the effects on a month-by-month basis, we also find similar
discontinuities at the threshold. This is shown in Figures 6 and 7, which present the results
separately for each month since April 2012 until November 2012, decomposing the aggregate
results from Figure 2, in such a way that each individual is observed only once in each
estimation. The results are stable, except in the cases of the last two months, as we consider
only jobcentre registrations up to September 2012. We also examine the means of several
background, predetermined variables across the different UB durations, to check for jumps
that may coincide with the actual threshold UB level. Such jumps could challenge the causal
interpretation of our results even if the nature of our data, in our main estimations, would be
biased against that case, given that the same individuals are observed over different values of
UB duration. In any case, the results in Figure 8, concerning age, UB level, UB start date
and UB maximum duration, do not support the case for jumps.
Another robustness check is based on Lee & Card (2008), which discuss extensively RD in
the context of a discrete forcing variable and suggest clustering standard errors on the values
of the forcing variable when estimating Equation 2. We reestimate the treatment coefficient
on reemployment probability, for all specifications of the polynomial function. We find that
standard errors are always higher, causing the coefficients for the linear specification, the
linear spline and the quadratic spline to become insignificant. However, for the quadratic and
cubic specification, the results (available upon request) are still significant, even at the 1%
significance level, with coefficients of 0.083 and 0.040, respectively.
We also conduct an important falsification test, based on a different social security data set
covering the year of 2011. This data set, also provided by II, includes longitudinal information
on a sample of about 100,000 individuals over every month in 2011, covering both earnings
and UB information. We use this data set to reconstruct as closely as possible the information
we use in our main analysis, namely in terms of the transitions to employment at different
unemployment spell durations. The results, drawing on a similar methodology as before, are
presented in Figure 9. We find that, in clear contrast to the findings in Figure 2, there is
no ‘jump’ in the transitions to employment at the UB duration of six months. On the other
hand, the downward pattern in such transitions is particularly similar to the one obtained for
the 2012 main results. We interpret this contrast between 2011 (when the programme was not
in operation) and 2012 (when it was), as additional supportive evidence of a causal impact of
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the programme in terms of transitions to employment.
In an additional check, again based on an alternative data set, we examine the labour force
statistics compiled by Statistics Portugal (INE). In particular, we focused on the transitions to
employment of the unemployed with more or less than six months of unemployment duration
before and after the Convocato´rias programme was in force, in the spirit of a difference-in-
differences analysis. We assumed all eligible unemployed were treated and imposed the same
data restrictions as those of our main analysis. We found positive results (available upon
request), of a similar magnitude as our main findings, although not statistically significant.
We take this evidence to be supportive of our benchmark results.
Finally, we also examined the effects of Convocato´rias along a subset of the 45 year-old
group, namely by drawing on the unemployed that are 44 years and seven months old up to
(but excluding) 45 years old in March 2012. These individuals become eligible in the month
of their 45th birthday, in the same way as the main subset considered in this paper when
the latter are unemployed for six months. Again we found positive results (available upon
request), of a similar magnitude as our main findings, and statistically significant, despite the
much smaller sample size. The graphical evidence is presented in Figure 10, indicating again
a substantial jump in transitions to employment at the threshold age.
7 Substitution effects
Having established that the programme had important reemployment effects, we now turn
to our analysis of substitution effects (also commonly referred to by displacement or general
equilibrium effects). By such effects we refer to the extent to which the gains in employment
transitions for the unemployed targeted by the programme were obtained, at least partly,
from fewer transitions amongst non-eligible unemployed. Empirical evidence on this matter
is not conclusive, as indicated in Section 2. Indeed, the two studies we review Blundell et al.
(2004), Cre´pon et al. (2013) present opposite evidence of displacement effects in their analysis
of programmes in the UK and France, respectively, the latter case (of significant effects) in
the context of a weak labour market.
We contribute a new approach to the analysis of this question, based on access to data
covering all the unemployed registered with a PES in a country and their transitions, namely
out of unemployment, at a monthly frequency. In particular, we examine the extent to which
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jobcentres and months in which there is a higher level of transitions to employment amongst
the Convocato´rias target groups also exhibit lower levels of transitions to employment amongst
the non-eligible unemployed. Should displacement effects be relevant, the two flows would be
negatively related. Additionally, in order to obtain causal evidence that is not affected by
shocks that simultaneously increase (or decrease) outflows of the two groups of unemployed,
we conduct our analysis using an IV approach.
Specifically, we instrument the outflows amongst the targeted unemployed (in a given
jobcentre and month) using the number of requests to attend meetings issued under the pro-
gramme and the stock of targeted unemployed (again in a given jobcentre and month). The
first instrument will explain the number of outflows of the target unemployed, given the ev-
idence above about the reemployment effects of the programme. Moreover, this instrument
should have no direct effect in terms of the outflows of non-eligible unemployed, unless indi-
rectly via any potential displacement effects. The second instrument will again explain the
outflows amongst the targeted unemployed, given that the larger the stock of such unemployed
individuals, the large the number of exits to be expected. Again, this instrument should have
no direct effect in terms of the outflows of non-eligible unemployed. Finally, as we also con-
trol fully for the roles of jobcentre time-invariant heterogeneity and month-specific effects in
driving the outflows from unemployment (amongst eligible and non-eligible unemployed in-
dividuals) variations in the stocks of the eligible and in the jobcentre meeting requirements
are likely to be driven by random factors, such as ‘bumps’ in the distribution of individu-
als of certain characteristics (namely whether they reach an unemployment duration or age
thresholds) or capacity issues in each given jobcentre and month.
Our empirical analysis is based on a novel data set, constructed from the same adminis-
trative information described in Section 4. We now consider all workers aged 63 or less, and
not only those aged 44 or less, that have been registered in a jobcentre between February
2012 and March 2013. After computing their transitions, namely to employment, based on
individual, longitudinal data, we aggregate the information in terms of 1,118 cells made up of
the 86 jobcentres and their monthly observations from February 2012 until March 2013.
Table 5 presents the resulting descriptive statistics. We find an average of 245.6 transi-
tions from unemployment to employment across all observations, of which 146.3 concern the
non-UBRs and 170.6 concern all unemployed except those UBR targeted by the programme
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(unemployed for six months or more or aged 45 or above - the latter category is the one
that includes those unemployed aged 45 or above that simultaneously are unemployed for six
months or more). The two target groups correspond to 46.3 and 28.7 UBRs per jobcentre per
month on average. Further evidence of deteriorating state of the labour market is obtained
from the average number of jobcentre enrolments over the period from individuals previously
employed, 299.5, and its comparison with the average of outflows (245.6). Finally, we also
report descriptive statistics concerning the number of UBRs potentially targeted by Convo-
cato´rias that are present in each jobcentre in each month: averages of 1,294.1 and 1,567.6
unemployed for six months or more or aged 45 or above, respectively; and 68.1 and 64.9 in-
dividuals from each such category that are subject to the programme. The large discrepancy
between the two sets of figures stems from the fact that the first two figures concern stocks
of individuals, many of which are observed in more than one jobcentre-month cell, while the
last two figures refer to different individuals that are required to attend jobcentre interviews
each month.
Next, we present the main equation estimated in our empirical analysis:
Yjit = βYkit + αi + λt + it, (3)
in which Yjit indicates the unemployment-to-employment outflows of non-eligible unem-
ployed registered in jobcentre i in month t. These can be all unemployed including the not
UBRs and excluding the UBRs unemployed for six months or more and the UBRs aged 45 or
above; or all unemployed that are not UBRs. Ykit indicates the unemployment-to-employment
outflows of eligible unemployed (UBRs unemployed for six months or more or the UBRs aged
45 or above) registered in jobcentre i in month t. Finally, αi is a set of (86) jobcentre fixed
effects, λt is a set of (13) month fixed effects and it is the error term.
Additionally, the first stage analysis if based on different combinations of the following
four instruments: the stock of UBRs unemployed for six months or more or aged 45 or above
that are registered in a month and in a jobcentre; and the stock of UBRs unemployed for six
months or more or aged 45 or above that are registered in a month and in a jobcentre and are
subject to requirements to visit their jobcentre under the Convocato´rias programme. These
four variables will have a direct impact upon the transitions of the UBRs, in one case because
of a scale effect (the more UBRs unemployed for six months or more in a given jobcentre and
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month, the more such UBRs that will become employed in that same jobcentre and month)
and the other because of the effect of the programme, as indicated in the results of the previous
sections for the case of the UBRs unemployed for six months or more and which we assume
can be extended to the case of the UBRs aged 45 or above.
Table 6 presents our findings from considering different versions of Equation 3. When
considering only the UBRs unemployed for six or more months (first row of results), we find
that our two instruments are significant and have the expected positive sign. Specifically, the
transitions to employment of the UBRs for six months or more increase by 4.2 individuals
per month per each additional 100 that are registered in a jobcentre and by 1.2 individuals
per month per each additional 100 that are required to participate in the Convocato´rias
programme. However, we do not find evidence of negative effects upon the transitions to
employment of not eligible unemployed, both all individuals except the eligible groups or all
non-UBRs. In the first case, the second-stage coefficient of transitions to employment of the
unemployed for six months or more is negative but not significant (coefficient of -0.36 and
standard error of 0.24). In the second case, the coefficient is positive and significant.
We also estimate a different version of equation 3, namely by allowing the transitions of
the non-eligible unemployed (either all groups except the UBRs unemployed for six or more
months or the UBRs aged 45 or above or only the group of unemployed not entitled to UBs)
to depend on the transitions of both groups of eligible UBRs (unemployed for six months or
more or aged 45 or more). Again we find the expected first-stage results, namely in terms of
positive and significant coefficients of the two instruments regarding the UBRs for six months
or more when explaining the transitions to employment of those unemployed. We find that
the number of UBRs aged 45 or above explains the transitions to employment of those UBRs
but we do not find significant effects from the number of such UBRs that are involved in
Convocato´rias. The latter result may suggest that the stream of the programme focused on
older workers was not so effective as the stream analysed in this paper, namely in terms of
short-term (following month) effects. On the other hand, we find that the stock of unemployed
for six months or more has a significant negative effect upon the employment transitions of
the UBRs aged 45 or above. In any case, when turning to the second-stage results, we find
that none of the four coefficients is negative, and three are even significantly positive. We also
conduct additional robustness checks (available upon request) based on different subsets of the
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data, additional outcome variables (including transitions from employment to unemployment)
and logarithmic versions of the variables, in which we find the same qualitative results as those
presented above, supporting the case of no significant displacement effects.5
Overall, we conclude that we do not find any evidence that the Convocato´rias programme
had any significant substitution effects. In other words, the gains in terms of reemployment
effects amongst the groups of unemployed individuals targeted by the programme were not
obtained at the cost of diminished transitions to employment amongst non targeted unem-
ployed, including the large number of unemployed that are not recipient of benefits, despite
the difficult situation of the labour market at the time.
8 Conclusions
The high levels of unemployment still observed in many countries following the 2008 financial
crisis raise considerable interest on the relative merits and potential of activation measures.
In fact, measures such as counselling, training, workfare, monitoring, or sanctions can play an
important role not only in addressing moral hazard problems that may follow from the gener-
ous UBs provided in many countries - these measures may also promote an effective lifelong
learning strategy that ensures that unemployment can become a relatively swift springboard
towards new, and ideally better, jobs.
Although several earlier studies have evaluated activation programmes, this paper is, to
the best of our knowledge, the first that examines an intervention of this type that was im-
plemented during a period of high unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate in our
case is about twice as large as the average of the rates prevailing at the times of the other
programmes whose evaluations we survey. We believe that, for instance from a policy per-
spective, it is particularly important to know what are the prospects of activation procedures
implemented at such times: although they may be potentially most important during eco-
nomic crises (van den Berg & van der Klaauw 2006), those periods may also be when the
impact of activation efforts are at their weakest, given the depressed levels of labour demand
and greater competition for jobs (Cre´pon et al. 2013).
In this paper, we analyzed a large activation programme implemented in Portugal in early
2012, when unemployment reached unprecedented high levels. The programme we evaluate,
5The F-tests of excluded instruments are rejected in all specifications while the Sargan over-identification
tests are also passed in the case of Panel B, although not always in the case of Panel A.
27
Convocato´rias, was based on requiring that certain groups of unemployed benefit recipients
participated in monitoring and counselling meetings in jobcentres, subsequently potentially
followed by an involvement of each individual in one or more active labour market measures
of a more intensive nature. Exploring the marked gaps in eligibility to participation in the
programme built into its structure, we implemented a fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis
based on a rich, merged longitudinal administrative data sets.
Our results indicate that the increased activation efforts delivered by the programme were
successful, despite the poor macroeconomic and labour market conditions at the time (and the
relatively short time span of the analysis). Indeed, the estimates imply a more than doubling
of the probability of reemployment for those unemployed subject to the intervention. The
effects estimated are typically of at least 4%, a figure that is similar to the average monthly
reemployment probability over the relevant unemployment duration range.
The main findings are also found to be robust to a large number of checks, including
alternative polynomial and spline structures, different subsamples of unemployed individuals,
and different jobcentres. Moreover, in an important falsification test, when replicating our
main analysis but using instead equivalent data for the year before the programme was intro-
duced, we find no evidence of jumps in the reemployment probability at the relevant threshold
unemployment duration. We also find no effects in terms of transitions to non-subsidised un-
employment or in terms of subsequent income levels, suggesting that the programme does not
have negative effects in terms of loss of social protection or poor job match quality (Acemoglu
& Shimer 2000, Petrongolo 2009).
Moreover, we draw on our coverage of all the unemployed registered in jobcentres, including
those not entitled to UBs, to assess the magnitude of any substitution or displacement effects.
However, we find no evidence of decreased transitions to employment amongst non-eligible
unemployed, even when instrumenting the outflows of the target unemployed groups using
information on the number of Convocato´rias interventions across jobcentres over time.
Finally, in order to address financial impact of the programme, we conduct a simple,
back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit exercise, based on our estimates. We also make a number
of assumptions: First, we consider that the doubling of the transition rate into employment
documented in our main findings prompts a decrease by half of the remaining (on average
twelve) months of subsidised unemployment. Second, we consider an average monthly UB of
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500 euros. Third, we base our estimation on a target number of 80,000 individuals subject to
the intervention in 2012 alone.
According to the parameters above, we find that the programme had a positive financial
impact 240 million euros in terms of its target cohort over its first year of operation alone.
This estimate assumes that displacement effects are negligible, given the evidence above.
This estimate also disregards the increased social security revenues that follow from any
additional employment spells. In relative terms, this estimate corresponds to over 10% of
the annual unemployment insurance budget and nearly 0.2% of GDP. Of course, this already
sizeable estimate does not take into account the positive human capital, psychological and
other difficult to measure effects from a speedier return to employment, particularly for the
long-term unemployed.
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Figure 1: Probability of treatment and number of observations by (centered) un-
employment benefit duration
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration (for instance, zero corresponds to
six months of UB and six corresponds to twelve months of UB). The left vertical axis (and the blue dots)
indicate the percentage of observations that are subject to a Convocato´rias intervention. The right vertical
axis (and the red line) indicate the total number of observations used in the pooled cross-section analysis at
each specific level of the centered UB duration distribution.
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Figure 2: Reemployment probabilities by (centered) UB duration
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the
probability of reemployment in the subsequent month. The red and green lines correspond to fitted linear
equations over the four and five observations at the left and right of threshold UB duration, respectively.
The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing its predicted value at that level of UB
duration.
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Figure 3: Unemployment exit probabilities by (centered) UB duration
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the
probability of unemployment exit in the subsequent month. The red and green lines correspond to fitted linear
equations over the four and five observations at the left and right of threshold UB duration, respectively.
The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing its predicted value at that level of UB
duration.
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Figure 4: Transitions to non-subsidised unemployment by (centered) UB duration
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the
probability of transitions to non-subsidised unemployment in the subsequent month. The red and green lines
correspond to fitted linear equations over the four and five observations at the left and right of threshold UB
duration, respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing its predicted value
at that level of UB duration.
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Figure 5: Income level in following month by (centered) UB duration
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the
mean income percentual variation (UBs or wages) in the next month. The red and green lines correspond
to fitted linear equations over the four and five observations at the left and right of threshold UB duration,
respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing its predicted value at that
level of UB duration.
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Figure 6: Reemployment probabilities by (centered) UB duration and month (April
to July 2012)
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Notes: Each graph depicts results for a subsample observed only in a specific month of the period covered,
from April to July 2012, respectively. The horizontal axis of each individual graph indicates the (centered)
values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the probability of reemployment in the subsequent month.
The red and green lines correspond to fitted linear equations over the four and five observations at the left
and right of threshold UB duration, respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by
computing its predicted value at that level of UB duration.
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Figure 7: Reemployment probabilities by (centered) UB duration and month (Au-
gust to November 2012)
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Notes: Each graph depicts results for a subsample observed only in a specific month of the period covered, from
August to November 2012, respectively. The horizontal axis of each individual graph indicates the (centered)
values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the probability of reemployment in the subsequent month.
The red and green lines correspond to fitted linear equations over the four and five observations at the left
and right of threshold UB duration, respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by
computing its predicted value at that level of UB duration.
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Figure 8: Mean values of background variables, by (centered) UB duration
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Notes: Each graph depicts results for a specific background, pre-determined variable. The horizontal axis
of each individual graph indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The red and green lines correspond
to fitted linear equations over the four and five observations at the left and right of threshold UB elapsed,
respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing its predicted value at that
level of UB duration.
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Figure 9: Falsification test: reemployment probabilities, by (centered) UB dura-
tion, 2011
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of UB duration. The vertical axis indicates the
probability of reemployment in the subsequent month in 2011, the year before the Convocato´rias programme.
The red and green lines correspond to linear equations over the four and five observations at the left and right
of threshold UB duration, respectively. The left line was extended towards the threshold value by computing
its predicted value at that level of UB duration. The results are based on a different data than the one used
for the main results.
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Figure 10: Reemployment probabilities by (centered) age: 45 years old age thresh-
old
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the (centered) values of age, in months. The vertical axis indicates the
probability of reemployment in the subsequent month. The red and green lines correspond to linear equations
over the observations at the left and right of threshold age, respectively. The left line was extended towards
the threshold value by computing its predicted value at that age. The results are based on a different sample
of data than the one used for the main results.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the unemployed, by month of partici-
pation
Participation
Year Month Age Female Schooling Married Obs
2012 Mar 36.27 .44 7.30 .47 7588
(5.99) (.50) (3.49) (.50)
Apr 35.87 .45 7.68 .49 16931
(6.21) (.50) (3.05) (.50)
May 34.34 .50 10.28 .45 16492
(6.29) (.50) (3.02) (.50)
Jun 34.41 .56 11.78 .42 12657
(5.98) (.50) (3.47) (.49)
Jul 34.32 .53 10.63 .42 6696
(6.17) (.50) (3.97) (.49)
Aug 34.15 .50 9.70 .42 4921
(6.22) (.50) (3.22) (.49)
Sep 34.02 .49 9.75 .42 4781
(6.62) (.50) (3.74) (.49)
Oct 34.54 .51 9.76 .43 4649
(6.22) (.50) (3.76) (.50)
Nov 34.16 .51 10.33 .40 2294
(6.28) (.50) (3.82) (.49)
Dec 34.71 .50 9.67 .44 419
(5.96) (.50) (3.97) (.50)
2013 Jan 34.83 .52 9.98 .51 1364
(5.88) (.50) (4.46) (.50)
Feb 35.15 .54 10.29 .49 1273
(5.88) (.50) (3.80) (.50)
Mar 34.30 .55 11.20 .47 775
(5.78) (.50) (4.00) (.50)
Total 34.85 .50 9.62 .45 80840
(6.23) (.50) (3.72) (.50)
Notes: Statistics refer to the month when the unemployed participated in the
programme and their characteristics in February 2012. Schooling measured in
years.
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Table 2: Participant descriptive statistics, pooled data
Means S.D.
Transition to employment 0.044 (0.21)
Transition out of unemployment 0.062 (0.24)
Transition to non-subsidised unemployment 0.017 (0.13)
Income percentual variation 0.010 (0.58)
Treatment variable 0.041 (0.20)
Eligibility 0.563 (0.50)
UB elapsed duration 6.21 (2.76)
Age 34.50 (5.66)
Female 0.497 (0.50)
Married 0.514 (0.50)
Foreigner 0.059 (0.24)
Schooling 10.01 (3.86)
Initial UB duration 588.94 (142.10)
UB daily amount 17.57 (6.79)
Observations 611,061
Notes: Statistics based on pooled monthly data, from February 2012 to Febru-
ary 2013. Transitions measured in terms of following month. Eligibility is
dummy variable equal to one if UB duration of six months or more. School-
ing measured in years. Initial UB duration denotes maximum number of days
of unemployment subsidy at beginning of spell. UB daily amount denotes euros
per day of unemployment subsidy, at beginning of spell.
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Table 3: Convocato´rias programme effects, different dependent variables and polynomials
Treatment effect on: 1st stage
Reemploym’t Transitions... Income results -
Polynomial probability out of to non-subsidy level eligibility
function unemploym’t unemploym’t effect
Linear 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.003 0.007 0.130***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.022) (0.001)
Quadratic 0.083*** 0.080*** -0.003 -0.011 0.114***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.026) (0.001)
Cubic 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.008** 0.017 0.133***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.028) (0.001)
Linear 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.000 0.002 0.106***
spline (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.023) (0.001)
Quadratic 0.097** 0.099** 0.002 0.237** 0.110***
spline (0.040) (0.041) (0.012) (0.109) (0.001)
Outcome mean 0.044 0.062 0.017 0.010 –
Obs. 611,061 611,061 611,061 600,412 –
Notes: Each coefficient and standard error pair is obtained from a separate 2SLS regression under a
specific spline structure (indicated in the left column) and dependent variable (indicated in the top row).
The last column presents the results for the first-stage results on programme eligibility term without
interactions), under each polynomial function. All specifications include a large set of control variables
(see main text). Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4: Convocato´rias programme reemployment effects, dif-
ferent subsamples
Subsample Coefficient S.E.
Women 0.063*** (0.013)
Over 34 years old 0.017* (0.009)
Over 35 years old 0.012 (0.009)
Over 9 years of schooling 0.102*** (0.016)
Married 0.032** (0.013)
Over 570 days UB potential duration 0.021** (0.009)
Over 600 days UB potential duration 0.011 (0.010)
Over e14.33 UB daily amount 0.033*** (0.011)
Constrained Jobcentres 0.021** (0.008)
Exclusion of subsidised employment 0.041*** (0.009)
Regression excluding covariates 0.047*** (0.008)
Notes: Each coefficient and standard error pair is obtained from a sepa-
rate 2SLS regression. Threshold levels correspond to sample medians (or
values close to the median - 34 years of age and 570 UB days thresh-
olds). Constrained jobcentres are jobcentres where the proportion of
newly-registered unemployed is higher than 70% of the stock of unem-
ployed in the respective centre. Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ 0.10,
** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics, by jobcentre-month cells
Means S.D.
Unemployment (U) to employment (E) transitions 245.60 (205.92)
U to E transitions (except 6+ months or 45+) 170.60 (144.99)
U to E transitions (non subsidised unemployed) 146.28 (118.44)
U to E transitions (unemployed for 6+ months) 46.28 (41.80)
U to E transitions (unemployed aged 45+) 28.73 (30.11)
Employment to unemployment transitions 299.51 (263.02)
Subsidised unemployed registered for 6+ months 1294.91 (1073.51)
Subsidised unemployed aged 45+ 1567.61 (1231.23)
Subsidised unemployed for 6+ months subject to ‘convocato´rias’ 68.11 (140.04)
Subsidised unemployed aged 45+ subject to ‘convocato´rias’ 64.88 (191.86)
Observations (jobcentre-month combinations) 1118
Notes: Statistics based on data aggregated by jobcentre and for each month, from February 2012 to
February 2013. The first six rows correspond to flows (computed in each jobcentre over a month) while
the last four rows correspond to the stock of individuals in a given status, again by jobcentre and month.
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Table 6: Convocato´rias programme substitution effects, different dependent variables and instruments
Dependent variables -
Transitions (not eligible): 1st stage results
Transitions U to E U to E unemployed 6+ months unemployed aged 45+
(eligible (except 6+ (non 6+ months subject to aged 45+ subject to
unemployed): or 45+) subsidised) ‘convoc’ ‘convoc’
Panel A - two instruments
U to E -0.361 0.297** 0.042*** 0.012**
(6+ months) (0.240) (0.164) (0.002) (0.005)
Panel B - four instruments
U to E 0.435 0.694*** 0.039*** 0.012** 0.008 -0.003
(6+ months) (0.303) (0.161) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
U to E 6.471*** 3.281*** -0.019*** 0.005 0.048*** -0.002
(aged 45+) (0.821) (0.437) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Jobcentre FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
Outcome mean 170.60 146.28
Obs. 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118
Notes: Each coefficient and standard error pair under each one of the two transition columns in Panel A is obtained
from a separate 2SLS regression. Each group of two coefficients and two standard errors under each one of the two
transition columns in Panel B is obtained from a separate 2SLS regression. The four last columns present the results
for the first-stage results, which are the same for the two outcome variables on the left. All specifications include fixed
effects for each jobcentres (86 in total) and months (13). Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, ***
p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A.1: Literature summary
Paper Country Year UR Intervention Outcome(s) Meth. Results
Dolton &
O’Neill
(2002)
UK 89 7.1 Job search coun-
selling interview
(Restart)
Unemployment rate RE ⇓ by 5 p.p.
Klepinger
et al. (2002)
US 94 6.1 Job search monitor-
ing or workshop
UB paid and num-
ber of weeks on UB
RE ⇓ by $115 and one
week
van den Berg
et al. (2004)
Netherl. 94 6.2 Sanctions (tem-
porary benefit
reduction)
Welfare to work
transition
Dur ⇑ by more than
140%
Black et al.
(2003)
US 94-
96
5.7 Mandatory employ-
ment and training
services
UB paid, number of
weeks on UB and
subsequent earnings
RE ⇓ by $143, 2.2
weeks and ⇑ by
$1050, respectively
Geerdsen
(2006)
Denmark 95-
97
6.1 Compulsory labour
market programmes
Employment transi-
tions
QE ⇑ by 145%
Manning
(2009)
UK 96 7.9 Increase in job
search requirements
and administrative
hurdle (Jobseeker’s
Allowance)
Transitions out of
unemployment, to
employment and to
non-subsidised un-
employment
DID ⇑ by 6%, no effect
and ⇑ by 6.7%, re-
spectively
Petrongolo
(2009)
UK 96 7.9 Increase in job
search requirements
and administrative
hurdle (JSA)
Likelihood of a spell
on incapacity bene-
fits and of positive
earnings
DID ⇑ by 2.5-3% and
⇓ by 4-5%, respec-
tively
Borland &
Tseng (2007)
Australia 97-
98
8.6 Work-search mon-
itoring (JobSeeker
Diary)
Out of unemploy-
ment transitions
and UB duration
Ma ⇑ by 5.1 p.p and ⇓
by 6%, respectively
Blundell
et al. (2004)
UK 98 6.1 Job assistance and
wage subsidies
(New Deal for
Young People)
Employment transi-
tions
DID ⇑ by 5 p.p.
McVicar
(2008)
N. Ire-
land
99-
05
4.5 Suspension of moni-
toring
Transitions out of
unemployment, to
employment and
other benefits
QE ⇓ by 17%, 26% and
8%, respectively
Hagglund
(2011)
Sweden 04 7.4 Active placement
efforts
Transitions out of
unemployment, to
employment and
other exits
RE ⇑ by 51%, 43% and
54%, respectively
Cockx &
Dejemeppe
(2012)
Belgium 04-
05
8.5 Monitoring of job
search efforts
Transitions to em-
ployment, training
and out of labour
force
RDD ⇑ by 9 p.p., no ef-
fect and no effect,
respectively
Graversen
& van Ours
(2008)
Denmark 05-
06
4.4 Mandatory activa-
tion programme
Transitions to em-
ployment
RE ⇑ by 30%
Cre´pon et al.
(2013)
France 07-
08
8 Job placement as-
sistance
Transitions to sta-
ble employment and
displacement effects
RE ⇑ by 11% but at
expense of eligi-
ble non-treated in-
dividuals
Boone et al.
(2009)
Netherlands– – Benefit sanction Job acceptance
probability
RE ⇑ from 1.4 p.p. to
50 p.p., depending
on benefit struc-
ture and wage of-
fers
Notes: This is a non-exhaustive summary of some of the main papers that seek to evaluate causally activation
programmes. Column 3 presents the unemployment rate for the respective country and year. If the study
spans multiple years, the rate is an average of the period. The unemployment data is from the Eurostat,
except for Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics). The methods are random experiment (RE), difference-
in-differences (DID), quasi-experiment (QE), matching (Ma) and regression discontinuity design (RDD).
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Table A.2: The diversity of activation strategies - examples from eight countries (1)
Belgium Denmark Germany Netherlands
Registration and benefit entitlement
Entitlement to benefits Before registration Simultaneously with
registration
Simultaneously with
registration
Before registration,
retroactive to date of
loss of work
Placement efforts at
initial registration
Referrals to vacancies None Referrals to vacancies Assessment of work
readiness+referrals
Detailed registration
interview
Yes, at first contact Yes, within a month Yes, within a fortnight Yes, at first con-
tact+profiling
Confirmation of status Declarations
(monthly)
Declarations
(monthly)
Declaration of rele-
vant changes
Declarations
(monthly)
Job search requirements
Frequency of reporting Depends on age and
on results of previous
interviews
Intensive interview
once every 3 months
Intensive interview 6
times a year
Monthly (no face-to-
face contact)
Number of actions to
be reported
Not specified Not specified Not specified 4
Services provided by the Public Employment Service
Use of direct referrals 1 to
3/year/unemployed
1 to
3/year/unemployed
No estimate No estimate
Reports on application
outcomes
Employers & unem-
ployed
Employers & unem-
ployed
Employers & unem-
ployed
Employers
Frequency of intensive
interviews
Monthly after 2 to 9M
unemployed
Once every 3 months 6 per year Depends on counsel-
lor assessment, unem-
ployed attributes or
profiling
Voluntary interviews 20% of interview time No information No information Not significant
Collective information
sessions
Mandatory participa-
tion (early in spell)
No information No information No information
Individual action plans 2 to 9M Within 9M/6M for
adults/youth
Within 1 week to 1M
after registration
1M for hard to place
clients
Participation in ALMPs
Compulsory or volun-
tary entry
Compulsory only if re-
ferred
Compulsory at 9M for
30-60 and 6M for oth-
ers
Voluntary Compulsory
Job-search verification
during participation
Yes No No No
Source: Authors’ analysis based on OECD (2007).
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Table A.3: The diversity of activation strategies - examples from eight countries (2)
Portugal Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Registration and benefit entitlement
Entitlement to benefits Simultaneously with
registration
Before registration
(waiting period: 5
days)
Simultaneously with
registration
Before registration
(waiting period: 7
days)
Placement efforts at
initial registration
Referrals to vacancies Referrals to vacancies Referrals to vacancies Referrals to vacancies
Detailed registration
interview
Yes, at first contact Yes, within a fortnight Yes, within a week Yes, within 3 weeks
(targeted)
Confirmation of status In-person attendance
(fortnightly)
In-person attendance
(monthly)
In-person attendance
(fortnightly)
Declarations (fort-
nightly)
Job search requirements
Frequency of reporting Variable In-person counselling
interview (monthly)
In-person coun-
selling interview
(fortnightly)
Fortnightly (no face-
to-face contact)
Number of actions to
be reported
Not specified Between 4 to 10 10 10
Services provided by the Public Employment Service
Use of direct referrals 1 to
3/year/unemployed
6 to
8/year/unemployed
6 to
8/year/unemployed
No estimate
Reports on application Unemployed Employers & unem-
ployed
Unemployed Unemployed
Frequency of intensive
interviews
Depends on counsel-
lor assessment, unem-
ployed attributes or
profiling category
Monthly Fortnightly Depends on counsel-
lor assessment, unem-
ployed attributes or
profiling category
Voluntary interviews No information No information Some No information
Collective information
sessions
Mandatory participa-
tion (early in spell)
Mandatory participa-
tion (early in spell)
Non existent Targeted to un-
employed likely to
exhaust benefits
Individual action plans Within 6M/3M for
adults/youth
Within the first 3M Within 1 week to 1M
after registration
Rare
Participation in ALMPs
Compulsory or volun-
tary entry
Compulsory only if re-
ferred
Compulsory only if re-
ferred
Compulsory at 10M
for youth and 22M for
25-49
Voluntary
Job-search verification
during participation
No Yes No Yes
Source: Authors’ analysis based on OECD (2007).
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